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Abstract  While forward  contracting differs from di-
rect  hedging  on  several  counts,  the  distin- Although  apparently preferred  by farmers  rect  hedging  on  several  counts,  the  distin- guishing feature of interest here is the absence to direct hedging as a forward pricing mecha-  of binty  with fosh
nism, forward contracting  has received little  o  ai  uncertainty  with forward  cash  con-
attention  in  the  literature  dealing with  op-  trcting. Forward  contracting  establishes
timal forward  pricing  levels.  An often-cited  eithe  certain  price  for contract  output
reason  for producer  preference  for forward  ^  ^  ^^  ^  "fixed"  price  contracts  or a reason  for  producer preference  for  forward  fixed basis with respect to a particular futures contracting is the absence of basis risks under  contract  in  the  case  of  "basis  contracts
that forward  pricing alternative.  This  paper  ^^t  m  the  case  of  «basis"  contracts. that  forward pricing  alternative.  This  paper  Producers can establish a fixed price for their presents  models of optimal forward contract-
ing  and  hedging  under price  and  yield  un-  contracted output anytime during the life of a  "basis"  contract.  At  the  time  price  is  es- certainty within a mean-variance  framework.  tablished  the  basis"  contract  becomes  in-
The results indicate  that basis certainty does  dse  ai  i  contract 
not explain preferences for forward contract-  ^tmguishable from a «fxed" price contract. not explain preferences for forward contract-  Handlers  typically cover their contract  com-
~~~~~~ing. ~mitments  to  producers  by  hedging  unless
Key  words:  forward  contracting,  hedging,  they have forward contracted their own sales.
yield uncertainty,  price  uncer-  Since  handlers assume  costs  and risks by of-
tainty.  fering forward contracts,  the basis offered on
C!  forward  contracts  calling  for  harvest  time Survey results  indicate that  producers of  foward  contracts  calling  for  harvest  time uagronomic  cros mindcae  that producers  of  delivery is usually less than the historic  har- agronomic  crops make  more  use  of forward  vest time  basis.  However,  the  basis  offered contracting than hedging as a forward pricing  on forward contracts occasionally  may equal
tool.  While  only  7.5  percent  of  surveyed  orexed  contracts occasn  ally  ma  eqal grain farmers  had  traded  futures  in  197  or exceed the historic norm as handlers make grain  farmers  had  traded  futures  in  1977,
nearly  20 percent  had sold grain  under for-  procurements  to  meet  their  own  forward
ward  cash  contracts  (Commodity  Futures  commitments  (Harris  and Miller). This paper presents  a model for determin- Trading Commission).  A survey of marketing  ing optimal  "xed"  price forward cash  con-
agencies  in  1974  indicated  that  55  percent  tti  leel  prices  and  yields  ar
of the corn,  49 percent of the soybeans,  and  uncertain  and  provides  comparisons  to  op-
33 pereent of the wheat purchased from farm-  ^  ^  and provides  comparisons  to  op- 33 pereent of the wheat purchased from farm-  timal  direct  hedging  levels  under  the same ers by those  agencies involved forward  cash  circumstances.  The  hypothesis  e  tested
contracts  (Heifner  et al.).  Forward cash con-  is  whether  the  absence  of  basis  risk  with
tracting  of upland  cotton reached  as  high as  forward  contracting  explains  apparent  pro-
75  and  50  percent  in  1973  and  1975,  re- 75  and  50  percent  in  1973  and  1975,  re-  ducer preference for forward contracting vis- spectively (U.  S. Department of Agriculture).  a-vis direct hedging as a forward pricing tool.
Despite its widespread use, forward contract-
ing has been  largely ignored in the research
literature dealing with optimal forward pric-
ing levels  in the face of both price and yield  THEORETICAL  MODELS
uncertainty,  a  situation  faced  by  producers  Previous studies have focused attention on of agronomic  crops  prior to harvest.  the  optimal  level  of direct  hedging relative
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139to cash sales in the face  of uncertain  prices  are:  f  =  price  of  futures  at  harvest;  p  =
and  yields.  Minimum  risk  hedging  levels  harvest spot price;  d  =  harvest basis,  d  =  p
(hedging levels which minimize the variance  - f;  and y  =  yield.  Finally,  X/2  represents
of returns)  when  prices  and  yields  are  un-  the  producer's  risk  parameter  (X/2  >  0);
certain have been derived by both McKinnon  E( );  V(  ); and C(  )  are the expected  value,
and  Heifner.  Heifner's  model  is  the  more  the  variance,  and  the  covariance  of  paren-
general  since  it also allows  for basis  risks-  thetical  terms,  respectively.
the  uncertainty  concerning  the  relationship  With  forward  contracting,  the  producer's
between cash and futures prices when hedges  objective  function  is:
are  lifted.  Using  Midwestern  soybean  data,  (1)  =  BG+E(p(y-B))-X/2[V(py)
Heifner's  estimated  minimum  risk  hedges
ranged from 57 percent of the expected crop  +  B2V(p)--2BC(py,p)],
in Iowa  to only  22  percent of the expected  where B  quantity forward contracted. With
Indiana crop. Rolfo derived  optimal hedging  B  a  the  hie  variable,  the  optimal  level
levels  a  g tB  as  the  choice  variable,  the  optimal  level
levels assuming that producers  maximize ex-  of forward  contracting  from  the  first  order of  forward  contracting  from  the  first  order
pected utility of income  within  a  mean-var-  condition  for maximization  of equation  (1)
iance  framework,  or  alternatively,  that  i:
producers'  utility functions  are  logarithmic.
Using cocoa data,  Rolfo found that yield and  C(py,p  G-E(p).
basis uncertainty  reduce  the ratio  of the op-  (2)  B  V)  GX(p)
timal hedge to expected output to well below
unity and may result in establishment of long  For comparative  purposes,  the optimal  level
futures  positions.  These  studies  treated  the  of futures  holdings  with  direct  hedging  in
production decision as exogenous in that the  the face of price, yield, and basis uncertainty
choice of input levels was  made prior to the  is given  by:
hedging decision.  (3)  N  C(y,f)  F-E(f)
Anderson  and  Danthine  have  considered  C(p  +  X(
the  case  in which  input and  hedging  deci-  (f)
sions are made simultaneously.  Their optimal  where  N*  =  the  optimal  amount  of futures
hedging  level  can  be  decomposed  into  an  holdings  (Rolfo).
expected output  component,  a  hedging  ad-  Equations  (2)  and (3)  are each comprised
justment term, and a speculative component.  of hedging and speculative components.  The
In none of these studies is forward contract-  first  term  of each  equation  is  the  hedging
ing considered  as  a  forward  pricing  mecha-  component and indicates the level of forward
nism. Nelson has discussed use of both futures  pricing activity which minimizes the variance
and forward contracts in forward pricing,  but  of returns.  The  speculative  component,  the
the  effects  of yield  uncertainty  on  forward  second component of each equation, reflects
pricing levels  are  ignored  in the analysis.  the effects of forward  pricing on the level of
In  the  following,  Rolfo's  mean-variance  returns.  This component  is  inversely related
model  is modified to allow for "fixed"  price  to  the producer's  risk parameter  and disap-
forward cash contracting  in the face of price,  pears if the producer  is infinitely risk averse;
basis,  and  yield  uncertainty.  An  individual  i.e., the producer seeks only to minimize the
risk-averse  producer maximizes utility of in-  variance  of returns.
come  from  predetermined  input  levels  by  In equation (3), the numerator of the spec-
the  optimal  choice  of forward  contracting  ulative term is the difference between futures
level within a mean-variance  framework.'  In  price prior to harvest and the expected  level
the way of notation,  the upper case  is  used  of futures  price  at  harvest  time  or  the  ex-
to denote  variables  always  known with  cer-  pected return from holding futures. This term
tainty.  These  are G  =  forward  cash contract  disappears if futures are unbiased; otherwise,
price;  F  =  price  of harvest  futures  prior  to  it  may be positive  or  negative  according  to
harvest;  and  D  =  basis  offered  on  forward  the level  of perceived futures  bias.  For for-
cash contracts;  i.e., D  =  G  - F.  Lower case  ward  contracting  (equation  (2)  ),  the  nu-
variables are uncertain by assumption.  These  merator  of  the  speculative  component
lAs pointed out by Rolfo,  implicit  in the use  of the mean-variance  model  is the  restrictive  assumption  that the
producer  has  either  constant  absolute  risk  aversion  or  that  his  utility  function  is  quadratic  and  risk  aversion
increases with wealth. The mean-variance  model has, however, been widely employed to determine optimal forward
pricing  levels  (Kahl).
140represents  the  difference  between  the  for-  EMPIRICAL  MODELS
ward  contract  price  and  the  spot  price  ex-
pected  at  harvest.  This  numerator  may  be  In  this  section,  optimal  forward  contract-
positive,  zero,  or negative according to both  ing levels for soybeans subject to price, basis,
the  level  of perceived  futures  bias  and  the  and yield  uncertainty  are  estimated  for ten
level of D relative to E(d).  The denominators  Coastal  Plain counties  in  South  Carolina  for
of the  speculative  components  of equations  each year from  1975  to 1984. 3 For compar-
(2)  and  (3)  include  the  variances  of spot  ative  purposes,  concurrent  optimal  direct
prices  and  futures,  respectively.  Note  that  hedging  levels  are  also  estimated.  The  pre-
basis uncertainty affects the speculative com-  harvest decision  dates for each forward  pric-
ponent for  forward contracting,  but not for  ing alternative  are those nearest April  15  for
direct  hedging.  The  relative  magnitude  of  which forward contract basis data for Charles-
V(f)  versus  V(p)  depends  upon  the  extent  ton,  South  Carolina,  are  available.  Forward
of  basis  variability  and  the  covariance  be-  contracting  and  spot deliveries  are  assumed
tween  harvest  time futures  and basis.  Yield  made  at Charleston  on dates nearest Novem-
variability  does  not  affect  the  speculative  ber  1  for which  Charleston  cash  prices  are
components  of these equations.  reported
The  hedging  components  of these  equa-  Following  Rolfo's approach, expectational
tions are  directly  related to  the covariances  ra  r tan  istoricdaa areused tomeasure
between  returns  from  spot  marketings  and  rather than historic  data  are used to measure between  returns  from  spot  marketings  and 
harvest  time prices, which,  in turn,  depend  price  and yield  uncertainty  under both  for-
on the extent to which the producer's output  ward pricing alternatives.  Futures price fore-
is  correlated with aggregate  output  and the  cast  error,  f,  is  given  by  (f  - F)/F where  f
elasticity  of demand.  Although  the denomi-  is the price  of November futures at the har-
nators  of these  components  contain  harvest  vest time  delivery and  F  is the price  of No-
time price variances,  there  is not necessarily  vember  futures  at  the  decision  date.  Cash
an  inverse  relationship  between  these  vari-  price forecast error,  p, is given by  (p - )/
ances and minimum risk forward pricing lev-  p where  p  is  the  Charleston  cash  price  at
els as the numerators  are not independent of  harvest  time delivery and  p is the expected
these variances. The hedging components are  Charleston harvest time cash price measured
independent  of forward price  as neither the  by  November  futures  at  the  decision  date
preharvest  futures  nor the  forward  contract  plus  the expected harvest  time basis.4 Yield
price  appears therein.  forecast error, y, is given by (y - y)/y where
The relative  magnitudes  of optimal  direct  y  is  realized  yield  and  is  forecasted  yield
hedging  and  forward  contracting  cannot  be  as  of  the  decision  date.  Revenue  forecast
determined  a priori  except under restrictive  eor fom cash  ae  thus jf  +  c + error from  cash marketings  is thus  - +  - + assumptions  as  to the distributions of yields  o  c  ^ 
and  prices.  If yields,  futures,  and  the  basis  Also  f  =  F(1  +  f),  =  (l  +  ),  and
at  harvest  are  stochastically  independent  P(  P)
(Bohrnstedt  and  Goldberger),  the  hedging  Optimal  forward  contracting  and  direct
components of both equations reduce to E(y)  hedging  levels  expressed  as  proportions  of
and the demoninator of the speculative  com-  forecasted  yield  are:
ponent for equation (2)  exceeds that of equa-  B  C [(1 +
tion (3)  by the amount V(d) for a given finite  (4)  =  P 
level  of risk  aversion. 2 Then,  if  D  <  E(d),  Y  V(p)
the optimal  level  of direct hedging exceeds
E(d)--D+  E(-) that of forward contracting regardless of per-  P  P
ceived futures  bias.  XypV(p)
2An  intuitive explanation  for  the result that E(y)  is the  risk minimizing  forward  pricing level  under stochastic
independence  is  offered by McKinnon  (p.  849).  Under stochastic  independence,  short  crops  are just  as  likely to
be  associated  with  low  harvest  prices  as  high  harvest  prices.  Purchases  in  the  cash  market  to  meet  forward
commitments would not increase the variance  of the producer's returns.  Forward sales of E(y)  allow the producer
to  protect himself against  price  variability without  worsening  the  influence  of yield uncertainty  on  the variance
of his returns.
3The  ten  counties  are  Allendale,  Bamburg,  Barnwell,  Calhoun,  Clarendon,  Florence,  Hampton,  Orangeburg,
Sumter,  and Williamsburg.
4The  estimated  harvest  time  basis  is  the  average  harvest  time  basis  for  the  previous  3 years.  The  cash  price
forecast  error used  here  differs from that used by Rolfo  (p.  105).  In  the current  notation,  Rolfo's measure  of that
error  is  (p  - F)/F;  i.e.,  futures are not adjusted  by a basis estimate  when used to forecast cash  prices.
sForecasted  yields  are  1 year  ahead  forecasts  from  linear trend  regressions  estimated  using yield  data  for  the
previous  10 years.
141and  Table  1 are  the  mean  covariances  (and  as-
N*  C[(l +  )(1  +)  fl  E(  sociated mean standard errors) between price
(5)  C  +  =  [  '  )  and yield forecast errors across the ten coun-
y  FV(f)  XFV(f)  ties. Note that these covariances  are positive
respectively.  Equations  (4)  and  (5)  are  es-  prior to  1978.  From  1978  onward,  the cov-
timated  for  each  of the  ten  South  Carolina  ariances  between  cash price  and yield  fore-
counties  for  each  year  between  1975  and  cast  errors  have  larger  absolute values  than
1984. For each of those years, the variances,  the  corresponding  covariances  between  fu-
covariances,  and  expected  values  involving  tures price  and yield  forecast errors.
f,  p,  and y are  calculated  from  the ten  im-  Equations  (4)  and  (5)  are  estimated  for
mediately  preceding  observations  on  those  each of the ten counties from  1975-84  for X
variables. Datasourcesareasfollows:yields---  0.01,0.10,  1.0,  10,  100,  and  oo,  with
South  Carolina  Crop  Reporting  Service;  fu-  averages across the counties reported in Table
tures  prices-  Wall  Street Journal Charles-  2.7 Optimal  forward  contracting  levels  la-
ton cash prices-Department of Agricultural  beled  CONTRACTA  are  derived  usingesti-
Economics  and  Rural  Sociology,  Clemson  mated  levels  of  E(P).  Contracting  levels
University,  and  The  State;  and  Charleston  labeled  CONTRACTB  are  derived  under  the
forward prices-Department  of Agricultural  assumption that E(p) = 0 (preharvest futures
Economics  and  Rural  Sociology,  Clemson  and  basis  estimates  are  unbiased).  Optimal
University.  hedging  levels,  labeled  HEDGE,  are derived
Displayed in Table  1 are the cash,  futures,  using sample  estimates  of E(f).  Note,  how-
and basis determinants of the optimal forward  ever,  that  optimal  hedging  levels  with  un-
pricing  levels for  1975-84.  With the  excep-  biased  futures  (i.e.,  E(f)  =  0)  are  identical
tion of 1975-6,  the variances  of forecast  er-  to  HEDGE  levels  for  X =  oo  since  the  nu-
rors for  spot pri  ces  exceed  those  of futures  merator  of  the  speculative  component  of
prices.  Variances  of forecast errors  for both  equation  (5)  equals  zero  in  this  circum-
prices trended upward  over 1975-84.  Means  stance.
of both cash  and  futures  forecast  errors  are  From Table 2, note that optimal contracting
uniformly positive; however, these means are  and  hedging  levels  are relatively insensitive
not significantly  different from  zero at the  5  to changes in %  between one and oo; i.e., the
percent  level. There  are no  trends  apparent  speculative  components  of optimal  forward
in  either  mean  over  the  sampling  interval,  pricing  levels  are  inconsequential  for these
but mean  cash  price  forecast errors  exceed  values of X. Also for values of X >  1, there
those  for  futures  after  1977.  With  the  ex-  are  downward trends  over time in all of the
ception  of  1977-8,  forward  contract  basis  forward  pricing alternative  levels due  to in-
offers are less than  or equal to the expected  creases in the variances  of forecast errors for
harvest  time basis  in Charleston.  cash  and  futures  prices  and  the  absence  of
Covariances  between  cash  marketing  rev-  corresponding  trends  in  the  covariances  of
enue  and  price  forecasting  error  and  yield  cash  marketing  revenue  and  price  forecast
forecasts  are  calculated  for  each  of the  ten  errors.  After  1976,  optimal  hedging  levels
counties  for  1975-84.  Owing  to space  lim-  generally exceed  optimal  contracting  levels
itations, only the means across the ten coun-  for  these  X values.  This  follows  from  the
ties and associated  mean standard errors  are  larger values  of V(p)  relative  to V(f)  after
shown in Table  1. As can be seen from com-  that year.  Optimal  forward  contracting  and
parison of these means to their corresponding  hedging levels greater than unity indicate that
standard errors, differences in these measures  risk averse producers would  have  incentives
across  counties  are  small.  While  there  is  a  to forward  price  quantities  in excess  of ex-
close  correspondence  between  the  co-  pected  production.  For  X >  1, optimal  for-
variance  terms  from  equations  (4)  and  (5)  ward  pricing  levels  greater  than  unity  are
for any year, the covariance term from equa-  encountered  from  1975-7.  On  these  occa-
tion (4) is never greater than the correspond-  sions, the sample covariances  between price
ing  term from  equation  (5).  Also shown  in  and yield forecast  errors  are positive.
6The hedging  component  of equation  (5)  differs by the  factor p/F from that derived by Rolfo  (p.  110)  due to
differences  in measurement  of p. See  Footnote  4.
7To avoid  the  cluttering of Table  2, mean  standard errors are not reported.  However,  as in Table  1, differences
across  counties  are  small.  Optimal  forward  contracting  and  direct  hedging  levels  for  each  of the  counties  are
available  from  the author  upon request.
142TABLE  1.  DETERMINANTS  OF  OPTIMAL  FORWARD  CONTRACTING  AND  HEDGING  LEVELS  FOR  SOUTH  CAROLINA  SOYBEANS,  1975-1984
Year
Determinant"  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
V(-)  .....  ..........  0.028  0.032  0.038  0.046  0.044  0.048  0.054  0.067  0.073  0.077
-............................. 0.029  0.032  0.035  0.045  0.043  0.047  0.053  0.065  0.072  0.073
E  . .......... 0.101  0.091  0.123  0.109  0.127  0.114  0.130  0.101  0.075  0.083
E()  ....  .............  0.104  0.097  0.124  0.107  0.123  0.110  0.128  0.099  0.072  0.074
F  .....................................  5.63  5.08  7.29  6.24  6.99  6.54  836  6.69  6.70  7.10
E(d)  ...................................  -017  -0.24  -0.23  -0.17  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.10  -0.07  -0.05
D ..............  -0.30  -0.25  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.05
C[(1 +)(1+),  ]  ..............  0.036  0.036  0.039  0.044  0.035  0.038  0.028  0.039  0.043  0.043
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
C[(1+P)(1+Y),  ..............  0.037  0.037  0.039  0.045  0.036  0.038  0.029  0.039  0.043  0.043
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)
C()  .............................  008  0.003  0.000  -0.003  -0.010  -0.012  -0.023  -0.025  -0.028  -0.031
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)
C(fi,)  ..  0.008  0.004  0.002  -0.001  -0.009  -0.010  -0.022  -0.024  -0.026  -0.029
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)
.......................................  19.5  20.6  20.4  21.6  20.8  22.9  19.7  20.2  20.7  19.2
(0.62)  (0.54)  (0.60)  (0.56)  (0.46)  (0.45)  (0.49)  (0.51)  (0.55)  (0.61)
-Units  of  measurement  for  F,  E(d),  and  D  are  dollars  per  bushel,  y  is  measured  in  bushels  per  acre.  Remaining  terms  are  proportions.  The
C[(1 +)(1  +  ),],  C[(1 +p)(  +y),f,  C(p,), C(f,y),  and y terms are means  for ten  South Carolina counties.  Mean standard  errors are shown  in parentheses.
L/ OJ\TABLE  2.  OPTIMAL  FORWARD  CONTRACTING  AND  DIRECT  HEDGING  LEVELS  FOR  ALTERNATIVE  RISK  AVERSION  LEVELS,  AVERAGES  FOR  TEN  SOUTH  CAROLINA  COUNTIES,  1975-1984
Risk aversion  Year
parametera  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984
..............................................................  Ratio  of optimal  forward pricing level  to expected yield  ........................................
X=  0.01
CONTRACTA  ................  -3.0  -1.8  -0.89  0.68  -1.3  -0.89  -1.0  -0.56  -0.21  -0.37
CONTRACTB  ................  0.52  1.07  1.37  1.15  0.73  0.71  0.48  0.59  0.54  0.43
HEDGE  .......................  -2.1  -1.8  -1.3  -0.79  -1.2  -0.77  -0.94  -0.54  -0.13  -0.16
X  0.10
CONTRACTA  ................  0.89  0.84  0.83  0.80  0.60  0.62  0.38  0.47  0.51  0.47
CONTRACTB  ................  1.23  1.13  1.06  0.98  0.80  0.78  0.52  0.59  0.58  0.55
HEDGE  .......................  0.93  0.82  0.83  0.80  0.63  0.65  0.39  0.48  0.52  0.51
X  1.00
CONTRACTA  ................  1.27  1.11  1.00  0.95  0.79  0.77  0.51  0.57  0.58  0.55
CONTRACTB  ................  1.31  1.14  1.03  0.96  0.81  0.79  0.53  0.59  0.59  0.56
HEDGE  ........................  1.23  1.08  1.04  0.96  0.81  0.79  0.53  0.58  0.59  0.58
X  10.0
CONTRACTA  ................  1.31  1.14  1.02  0.96  0.81  0.78  0.53  0.58  0.59  0.56
CONTRACTB  ................  1.32  1.14  1.02  0.96  0.81  0.79  0.53  0.59  0.59  0.56
HEDGE  .......................  1.26  1.10  1.06  0.97  0.83  0.81  0.54  0.59  0.59  0.59
X  100.0
CONTRACTA  ................  1.32  1.14  1.02  0.96  0.81  0.79  0.53  0.59  0.59  0.56
CONTRACTB  ................  1.32  1.14  1.02  0.96  0.81  0.79  0.53  0.59  0.59  0.56
HEDGE  ........................  1.27  1.11  1.07  0.97  0.83  0.81  0.54  0.59  0.59  0.59
X =  oo
CONTRACTA  ................  1.32  1.14  1.02  0.96  0.81  0.79  0.53  0.59  0.59  0.56
CONTRACTB  ................  1.32  1.14  1.02  0.96  0.81  0.79  0.53  0.59  0.59  0.56
HEDGE  ........................ 1.26  1.11  1.07  0.97  0.83  0.81  0.54  0.59  0.59  0.59
*CONTRACTA  =  optimal forward  contracting  level  using estimated  E(P).  CONTRACTB  =  optimal forward  contracting level  assuming E(P)  =  0.  HEDGE  =  optimal
hedging  level using  estimated  E(f).Changes in X  below unity result in dramatic  producers'  risk  preferences.  These  results
reductions in optimal forward pricing  levels  suggest that rule of thumb recommendations
for CONTRACTA and HEDGE. When X =  0.01,  such  as forward  price one-half to two-thirds
the speculative components of these forward  of expected  yields may be inappropriate  for
pricing  alternatives  overshadow their  corre-  some  producers. Extension  efforts should fo-
sponding  hedging  components,  resulting  in  cus on educating  producers  as  to how indi-
negative  optimal  values.  That  is,  producers  vidual  circumstances  affect  optimal forward
would  have  incentive  to be  long in futures  pricing ratios.
under  HEDGE  or  to  offer  forward  contracts  The  results  presented  here  indicate  that
under the CONTRACTA alternative. For 1978-  the absence  of basis  risk with forward  con-
9,  when  D  >  E(d),  reductions  in  X below  tracting  does  not  explain  producer  prefer-
unity increase optimal levels of CONTRACTB.  ence  for  forward  contracting  over  direct
In all other years, levels  of CONTRACTB  are  hedging as a forward pricing tool. An obvious
reduced  by reductions  in X, although not to  explanation  follows  from the  naivete  of the
the extent to which CONTRACTA and HEDGE  mean-variance  model  employed.  Whether
are reduced.  these results hold for alternative utility func-
SUMMARY  ATIND  CONCLUSIONS  tions deserves further research;  however,  re- SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS cent  evidence  indicates  that  the  mean-
Rolfo's  mean-variance  model  is  extended  variance  model  performs  well  when  com-
to accommodate  forward contracting  (which  pared  to  direct  utility maximization  (Kroll
is not subject to basis risk)  as an alternative  et al.).
to direct  hedging  (which  is  subject to  that  The  present  analysis  has  ignored  differ-
risk)  with  applications  to  soybean  data.  ences in margin requirements between direct
Counter  to  intuition,  both  theoretical  and  hedging and forward contracting.  Nelson has
empirical  analyses indicate  that the  absence  argued that the costs associated with margin
of basis risks with forward contracting  does  accounts  required  with  direct  hedging  are
not necessarily  lead  to higher  levels  of for-  likely  to be trivial  in most  cases.  However,
ward  contracting  relative  to  direct  hedging  access  to  credit  may  differ  according  to
for producers who are  infinitely risk  averse.  whether crops are hedged directly or forward
Infinitely risk  averse  producers  would  have  contracted  (Barry  and Willmann;  Harris  and
incentive to forward contract or hedge quan-  Baker).
tities  smaller  (larger)  than  their  expected  The  research presented  here  could be  ex-
output  if yields  and harvest  time  prices  are  tended in several ways.  South Carolina is not
negatively  (positively)  correlated.  Another  a  major  soybean  producer,  thus the  current
surprising  result  is  that  although  the  vari-  empirical  results  may  not be  applicable  to
ances  of  harvest  time  price  forecast  errors  major producing regions such as the Midwest
have  steadily increased  from  1957  to  1984,  and the Delta. There is  a need to extend the
risk  minimizing  forward  contracting  and  analysis  to  other  producing  regions.  The
hedging  levels have decreased  over the same  analysis could be expanded to accommodate
interval. Although  optimal forward contract-  alternative  forward  pricing  tools;  e.g.,  op-
ing  and  hedging  ratios  are  relatively  insen-  tions.  Kenyon  has  argued  that  yield  uncer-
sitive  to  changes  in  the  risk  aversion  tainty is less of a problem with options than
coefficient  above  unity,  these ratios  are  sen-  with hedging.  Finally,  the analysis  could be
sitive  to  changes  in  that  coefficient  below  expanded  to incorporate  the  effects  of gov-
unity.  Thus,  optimal  forward  pricing  ratios  ernment  price-support  programs  on  harvest
are  variable  with  respect  both  to time  and  time price variability.
REFERENCES
Anderson,  R. W.  and J.  P.  Danthine.  "Hedger  Diversity in Futures  Markets."  The Econ. J.,
93(1983):  370-89.
Barry, P. J.  and D.  R. Willmann.  "A Risk-Programming Analysis  of Forward Contracting  with
Credit Constraints."  Amer. J.  Agr.  Econ.,  58,1(1976):  62-70.
Bohrnstedt.  G.  W.  and  A.  S. Goldberger.  "On the Exact Covariance  of Products  of Random
Variables." J. Amer.  Stat. Assoc.,  64(1969):  1,439-42.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  "1977  Report on Farmers' Use of Futures  Markets
and Forward  Contracts."  Mimeographed  paper,  1978.
145Department of Agricultural  Economics and Rural Sociology. Clemson University.  "Marketing
Highlights."  various  issues.
Harris,  H.  M.  and S. E.  Miller.  "An Analysis of Cash Contracting Corn and Soybeans in South
Carolina."  National Conference on  Grain Marketing Patterns, Tennessee  Valley
Authority,  Circular Z-173,  1981.
Harris,  K.  S. and  C.  B.  Baker.  "Does  Hedging  Increase  Credit for  Illinois  Crop Farmers."
No.  Cent. J.  Agr.  Econ., 3(1981):  47-52.
Heifner,  R.  G.,  J.  L.  Driscoll,  J.  W.  Helmuth,  M.  N.  Leath,  F.  F.  Niernburger,  and  B.  H.
Wright. "The U.S. Cash Grain Trade in 1974: Participants,  Transactions, and Information
Services."  USDA,  ERS,  Agricultural  Economics  Report  No.  386,  1977.
Heifner,  R.  G.  "Minimum Risk  Pre-Harvest Sales  of Soybeans."  Mimeographed  paper,  USDA,
1978.
Kahl,  K.  H.  "Determination  of the  Recommended  Hedging  Ratio."  Amer.  J.  Agr.  Econ.,
65,3(1983):  603-5.
Kenyon,  D.  E.  "Farmers'  Guide  to Trading  Agricultural  Commodity  Options."  USDA,  ERS,
Agricultural  Information  Bulletin No.  463,  1984.
Kroll, Y., H. Levy,  and H. M. Markowitz.  "Mean-Variance  Versus Direct Utility Maximization."
J. Finance, 39(1984):  47-61.
McKinnon, R.  I.  "Futures Markets, Buffer Stocks, and Income Stability for Primary Producers."
J.  Political  Economy,  57(1967):  844-61.
Nelson,  R.  D.  "Forward  and  Futures  Contracts  as  Preharvest  Commodity  Marketing  Instru-
ments."  Amer. J.  Agr.  Econ., 67,3(1985):  15-23.
Rolfo, J.  "Optimal  Hedging  Under  Price  and  Quantity  Uncertainty:  The  Case  of a  Cocoa
Producer." J. Political  Economy,  88(1980):  100-16.
South Carolina  Crop  Reporting  Service.  "South Carolina  Crop Statistics."  various  issues.
The State.  Columbia,  South Carolina.  various  issues.
U.  S. Department  of Agriculture,  Agricultural  Marketing  Service.  "Cotton  Market  News."
various  issues.
Wall Street Journal. New York.  various  issues.
146